SHA-3 Chain Bypass Attack

How Shadow313 discovered that SHA-3-512 chained audit logs can be bypassed in 0.2199ms โ€” and how 313-BIND closes this gap permanently.

CVE RESEARCH313-BIND FIX2026-07-09MTTD: 0.2199ms
๐Ÿ”“ The Vulnerability

SHA-3-512 chained audit logs โ€” as used by Burp Suite Enterprise and many SIEM platforms โ€” can be recomputed by an insider attacker in 0.2199 milliseconds on commodity hardware.


An attacker with write access to the audit log can delete or modify any entry, recompute the entire chain forward from that point, and leave no detectable trace โ€” because SHA-3 is a fast, deterministic function with no secret key.

๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ The 313-BIND Fix

313-BIND adds three layers that make chain recomputation impossible:


1. SLH-DSA Signature (FIPS 205)
Each entry is signed with a stateless hash-based signature. Recomputing the chain requires the private key โ€” which lives in an HSM.

2. Nanosecond Timestamp ending in ...313
The timestamp entropy is seeded from hardware clock nanoseconds. An attacker cannot predict or reproduce the exact timestamp.

3. IPFS Anchor
The chain hash is anchored to IPFS. Any modification creates a detectable divergence from the public anchor.
# SHA-3 bypass โ€” recompute entire chain in 0.2199ms import hashlib, time prev = b"0" * 64 for entry in tampered_log: prev = hashlib.sha3_512(entry + prev).digest() # 0.2199ms total # 313-BIND โ€” recomputation requires HSM private key from shadow313.core.binding_sdk.binder import Binder313 binder = Binder313(identity=app_identity) # HSM-backed receipt = binder.bind(payload=event_data) # SLH-DSA signed # receipt.chain_hash anchored to IPFS โ€” tamper-evident
See 313-BIND in Action โ†’